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CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITI'EE 
Senator Douglas Releases st~tement on the Conoequences 
of the Breakdown in Negotiatfons between the United 
Kingc1om and the Common Market Coun~ries 
Senator Paul H. Douglas (D., Ill..), Cbai:r.ma.n of the Joint Economic 
Committee, today released a letter from the Honorable George W. Ball, 
Undersecretary of State. The letter provides a. statement of the 
Administrationts appraisal of the implications for the foreign economic 
policy of the United States of the breakdown in negotiations between the 
United Kingdom and the European Economic CommU12ity, or the Common Y.arket. 
,.,., C, ' 
Jotnt E~oncmic 
The lat ter waa Bent in response to a/Committee resolution, presented 
in the form of a question :901,ed by Senator Jacob K. Ja.vita (R., N.Y.), to 
the Honorable C > Doug::!.a.s Dillon, Secretary of the Treasury, d1!ring his 
testimony befor~- the ,:"•;·:nt Bconomic Committee on Ja:i:n,a:-y 31, 1963. The 
question read as follo·.vs: 11Mr~ Secretary: In view of the changed situation 
caused by the E~EoC.'a rejection cf the British application for membership, 
what is the Adm!nistro.tion 1s :policy as it affects the Trade Expansion Act 
of 1962 and other asI>E:cts of our relationship with the E.E.c., the United 
Kimgdom, the British Commonwealth, and the European Free Trade Association?" 
In releasing the letter Senator Douglas said, "This letter ordinarily 
would be made available to the public in the Committee's printed record of 
its recent hearings on the President's Economic Report. The statement deals 
with a topic so vital to the economic and military strength of the free 
world that a se:pa.rate release is desirable in order to bring the matter 







Dear Senator Douglas: 
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE 
WASHINGTON 
February 15, 1963 
Secl:'etary Dillon has called my attention to the transcript of 
his testimony before the Joint Economic Committee on January 31. 
In the course of his colloquy with the Committee several members 
expressed an interest in the Administration's appraisal of the 
implications for the United States foreign economic policy of the 
breakdown in negotiations between the United Kingdom and the EEC, 
The signifi.cance of this event can best be appraised in re-
lation to other trends and. events involved in the evolution of 
United States polfoy toward Europe. 
I 
It is generally recognized that the progress of Europe toward 
unity has been emong the most constructive and promiRing achieve-
ments of the post-war period, Through the creation a.nd de;relopment 
of the European Economic Comm1L~ity, Europe has moved a long way 
toward economic integration. ~'hat goal, however, is far from 
full attainment and many difficult problems remain, 
The United States has consistently 1,ncouraged the nations of 
Europe toward greater unity. Both the Legislative and Executive 
Brat.eh of ou.r Government have provided this encouragement--by 
word and by action. We regard gre::..t..r European unity as essential 
primarily for JJOliti.cal reasons-~although, over the long run, the 
United States Ghould a.lso benefit econom:l.ca.lly from the contribution 
of the Common Market to a higher level of European economic acvitity. 
A United E>.1r,Ype would eliminate the frictions and jealousies 
that have been th~ cuuGe of so :cr:c1ny :pe.at conflicts--conflicts 
that on two occasions have embroiled the whole world in 
catastrophe. Moreover, a unified Europe could effectively mobilize 
the common s t.rer.g'th of the El;.ropean people , It should thus be 
able to pls.y the role of equal partner with the Ul1ited States, 
carrying its fU-ll share of the common responsibilities imposed by 
history on the economically-advanced peoples of the Free World, 
II 
'.fu.e basis for such a pa.rtnersM.p is hard economic fact, In 
the North Atlantic World--Westcrn Europe and North America--there 
is concentrated 90% of all Free World Industrial strength as well 
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as the cr2at hllk of the Free World's technical skill and knowledge. 
This combined resource must be put to the defense and advancement 
of the Free World. 
Combined action is particularly important in three areas: 
First, Europe and North America must join in a common defense 
against the aggressive ambitions of the Colllr.lunist Bloc. The 
defense of Europe is vital to the United States as well as to 
Europe itself. It is a costly task; tl::e growth of European 
strength permits Europe to make an increasing contribution to it. 
Second, the national economies of the nations comprising the 
great industrial complex of the North Atlantic are interdependent. 
This is becoming fulcreasingly evident. A slow-down in growth rates 
in Europe could adversely affect our own growth rate, while an 
American recession would have serious repercussion in Europe. 
Our balance of payments deficit is, to a large extent, the mirror 
image of balance of payments surpluses of C<lrtain major European 
countries. If one nation or area adopts res·~rictive commercial 
polj.cies, tnose policies will find reflection in compensatory or 
retaliatory actions by its trading partners. 
The recognition of this economic interdependence has led us 
to seek new means to coordinate and harmonize our domestic 
economic policies, Substantial progress toward this end has been 
achieved through the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development. Much further progress is required. 
Third, the major industrialized areas of the Free World--the 
Atlantic nations--must commit large amounts of money, equipment 
and skill to assist the less-developed countries in raising their 
standards of living, if polit1.cal stability is to be achieved and 
the dangers of subversion reduced. The effective utilization of 
Free World resources for this purpose requires a high degree of 
coordination of effort, We are beginning to achieve that 
coordination through the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, 
Fourth, if the resources of the Free World are to be efficiently 
utilized obstacles to the free flow of international trade must be 
reduced and trade expanded under conditions where the forces of 
comparative advantage can :f'ulJ.y operate. This means that American 
goods must have greater access to the European markets while we 
must provide greater access for European goods to our own markets. 
Just as in other fields, benefits and obligations must be 
reciprocal. III 
During the past few years United States Policy has been 
increasingly based on the belief that these common tasks could best 
be achieved by the pursuit of two parallel lines of action--the 
attainment by Europe of a greater unity so that the European nations 
may act on a widening subject matter through common institutions 
and the attainment of a high degree of Atlantic cooperation through 
institutional arrangements designed for that purpose, 
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We have also felt that the effectiveness of our European 
partner would be greatly enhanced if a unified Europe were expanded 
to include the United Kingdom, We were, t:herefore, gratified 
when the United Kingdom Gov-ernment decided to apply for membership 
in the European Economic. Community. We reeognized at tha;t time, as 
we do now, that the organization of E'<1rope was a problem for the 
Europeans, and that it involved grave national deci&ions for the 
participating nations. We have not, therefore, sought to influence 
these decisions but at the same time··-since we have been re-
peatedly asked by our European fr:!.ends--we he.ve been frank in 
stating that, in our view, the accession of the United Kingdom to 
the Rome Treaty would contribute to the economic strength and 
:political cohesion of Europe and thus advance the prospects for a 
full and effective Atlantic Partnership, 
During the course of the negotiations for the accession of 
Great Britain to the EEC--the United States Government was 
repeatedly assured by the Six, including the French Government--
that none of the parties had any political objection to United 
Kingdom membership in the EEC. We recognized, at the same time 
that the negotiations involved co1:1plex technical and economic 
problems--and there was always the J;>:>Ssibility that these problems 
might not be solved to the satisfaction of all parties, We, 
therefore, r"'cugnized t:,e possib:tlity--although not the probability--
that these negotiations would brea,k down, 
The veto of the Frerwh Govern.'!lent terminating the negotiations 
occurred at a time when the technical e.nd economic problems were 
well on their wa.y to solution. This has been made clear by the 
statements issued by the Commission of the E'~ropean Economic 
Community, In our op1.nion, the action of the French Government 
must be regarded as mo·tivated primarily by political reasons, 
It is still too early to know with precision what the French 
Government I s veto may imply for future French policy. It seems 
clear enough, however, that this action ha.a not cha.,ged the 
underlying facts that have dictated the need for greater European 
unity or effective Atlantic cooperation. We believe, also, 
that these facts are generally understood by the great body of 
European opinion. 
'.!:hey can be briefly sUlllll'larized: 
l, Europe cannot defend itself today by its own efforts; 
its defense rests heavily upon the overwhelming nuclear strength 
of the United States. 
2. The nuclear defense of the Free World is indivisible. 
3, The great industrial economies of the North Atlantic 
countries are to a high degree interdependent. 
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4. To reap the full economic benefits of this interdependence 
requires a free flow of trade. 
5. The urgent needs of the newly develc:ped ne,t:f.ons require 
effective comm.un effort on the l)cl.rt of the major industrializ~d 
powers of the Free World. 
The existence of these facts, it seems to us, determines the 
broad policy lines that we intend to pursue. 
First, we shall continue to enoourage the development of 
European unity and to eXl)ress the hope that arrangements may 
ultimately be ma.de for the accession of Great Brite.in to full 
membershi~ in the EEC. Recent events have demonstrated a sub-
stantial body of Euro~ean opinion in favor of Britain's partici-
pation in a uniting Europe and the British Gover:u:nent has :c:ade 
knmm its own desire tba't the Un:t.ted Kingdom should play a full 
role in this development. 
But while we continue to regard the ultimate accession of 
Great Britain to the Rome Tr.eat-y c s un objective to be encouraged, 
we recog.:'lize that it is rmJ_·lkel y t o Ct'.cur for some time. Meanwhtle 
recent events do not ap~ear to have d~stroyed the vitality of the strong 
Europee.n drive toward uni ty nor S('!ri01.!Sly impaired the value of the 
integration so far ach:!.e·red t hrough 'the EEC. Obviously, it is in 
the interests of the whole Fr.ee World tha.t the EEC develop in an 
outward-looking m9.!lner a.nd that i·lj not acquire autarchic 
characteristics. We pro:PCse to urm our influence to this end. 
Second, we shall seek to ad1rance th~ arrangements for close 
economic cooperation wi tn Euro:pe "';hrough the OECD. We shall 
also continue to develop cloee cooperatton in the monetary field 
throue;h the IMF, the Uommittee of Ten, and Working Party Three 
of the OEC:D. 
Third, we s~ll continue tc work tQward the strengthening of 
NATO and the develo:prnent of adequate ccnvent:i.onal forces in Europe. 
We see dangers in the proliferation of national nuclear deterrents 
but we recognize the desire of Europeans to play a fUll role in 
thei r own nuclear de:fense • We l1B.ve, therefore, proposed the 
craation of a multilateral nuclear force, within NATO, and we reached 
agreec1~nt with the British Governm~nt at Nassau for the mutual 
support of such a force. Amba.ssadcr Livingston Merche.nt is going to 
Europe next wP.ek for exploratory discussions. 
Fourth, we int~nd to utilize to the fullest the :powers 
granted to the President under th~ Trade E>q>a.nsion Act in order 
to improve accees to the European Gomm.on Market as wall as other 
major world markets for products of United S~ates farms and 
factories. Govern,Jr Hert~r intends to p:i.·0ss liberalization of 
trade as rapidly as :possible. 
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Since General de Gaulle's press conference on January 14, 
suggestions have been put forward for the United States to join in 
special commerctal relations w.tth one or another gi-oup of nations to 
form a trading bloc competitive with the Euror,ean Common Market. 
We do not believe that this would be sou.'lci policy. For thirty 
years, the United Sts.tes has consistemtly adhered to t,he ,~ost-
favored-nation principle and to the eX)?flnsion of trade on a 
nondiscriminatory basis. For us to enter into preferential 
t-raclbg relattor,s with any nation or nations would mean discrimin-
ation a.gainst all other nations. Such a policy would be inconsistent 
with our position as the leader of the Free World. 
You and Congressmn Reuse h:1:ve raised the question of the 
adequacy of the powers provided by the Trade Expansion Act if it 
should develop that the UK does not become a member of the EEC prior 
to the opening of the Kennedy round of negotiations. You have 
introduced legislation that would so amend the Act that the scope 
of the so-called "predomi.ns.nt supplier" clause would be unaffected 
by the fP.ilure of the UK-EEC negotiations. The Administration's 
position with respect to thi.s pro:posed legislation was stated by 
the President at his press conference of February 7 when he said: 
"No, we haven 1t planned to ask the Congress, because we do 
have the power, under the 1.rrade Expansion 'bill, to reduce all 
other ta.rii':fs by 50 per cent, which is a substantial 
authority. We lack the zero auth.:>ri ty. 
"On the other hand, it is going to take some months before 
these negotiations move ahead. It is possible there may be 
some reconsidel"S.tion of the Br:!.tieh application. I would be 
responsive and in favor of legisl.ation of the kind that you 
described, It is not essential, but it would be available, and 
if the Congress shows any dispositions to favor it, I would 
support it." 
Fifth, we propose to continue to develop techniques to improve 
the coopemtion of the major industrialized powers in providing 
assistance to the less-developed countries. This does not mean the 
abandonment of national programs of assistance but rather their 
more effecti,re coordination. At the same time, we shall try to 
assure a greater contribution to this common effort on the part of 
the European countries. 
The broad lines I have described suggest the general directions 
of our policy. These policy goal8 have been and will continue to be 
pursued tLrough a var:l.ety of instrumentaJ.i ties and in 2. variety of 
forms. The ve1;0 of British accession to the EEC is not an 
insuperable obstacle to those po~icies. In 1954, the French 
Assembly turned down the European Ds,fense Community Treaty, but 
the next few yea.re were ye&rs of unprecedented progress towards 
European integration along other lines. The basic soundness of 
US policy was not affected. 
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So today we have sought to chart a course that corres:ponds to 
the requi.rcmenta of United States interest--to pursue a positive 
line of :poJ.j.cy rs:ther t.!m.n mer,1ly to react to, or to follow, the 
policies of ot~er Governments. This seems to us the only posture 
befitting the leading nation of the Frc0 World. 
Sincerely yours, 
/s/ George W. Ball 
George W. Ball 
